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Abstract
In this paper we study the mathematical foundations of different evolutionary models that
analyze the evolution of a society composed of two populations with antagonistic interests.
Populations are involved in a conflict whose solution depends on the action chosen by each
individual. None of them are able to impose a solution on the other population. Two indi-
viduals, one from each population, are randomly chosen to play a game. In a strategic way,
each individual of each population, must choose one of two feasible strategies. The solution
obtained for each population will be the result of the aggregated action of the individuals.
1 Introduction
Several topics of the social sciences and in particular of the economic theory, have been modeled
considering two populations with opposing interests confronted in a conflict whose solution de-
pends on the strategic choice of each one of the individuals that make up this population. In their
simplest form each of these individuals choose between two possible strategies.
The choice results in the strategy that each individual understands as the best for their own
interest in the context of the conflict in which they are immersed. As long as the conflict is
repeated in period after period, they will be forced to choose a different strategy at each stage
from the one previously chosen or to continue with the previous behavior. According to the
strategic choice of the individuals of each population, it will be divided into two subpopulations,
whose real sizes are modified according to the choice made by them. That is, each subpopulation,
within each population, will be characterized by the strategy followed by those who compose it. A
generalized version of this approach can be found in [ Borkar V. S., Jain, S and Rangarajan, G].
There is a wide literature in which applications of the dynamics of the replicator to population
genetics and in general to biology are analyzed. An interesting survey on this topic is introduced
in [Hofbauer, J., and Sigmund, K.]. In this work we are interested in the applications to society,
in particular, in social conflicts whose evolution can be analyzed using this dynamic and whose
results can be modified from a successful choice of model parameter values.
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The evolution of a society composed by two populations facing a conflict as above character-
ized has been modeled using evolutionary games theory, and in particular the dynamics of the
replicator. Some works following this approach are for instance, [Accinelli,E.; Covarrubias, E.],
[Accinelli E. y O. Salas.], [Accinelli, E.;Sánchez Carrera, E,;Policardo, L,; Salas, O.],
[Accinelli E,; Carrera, E.] and [Accinelli,E.; Martins, F.; Oviedo, J.; Pinto,A.; and Quintas, L.;].
Extension of this theory to other games are analyzed in [Cressman, R. and Tao, Y].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we consider the model for a two
populations game. In section we introduce the replicator dynamics. We analyze the stability of
its equilibria and their relationship with the Nash equilibria. In section we give the final remarks.
2 The model
The society consists of two populations denoted by I and II. Individuals in each population can
choose between two possible strategies. According with the choice made by each individual of each
population, they will form a subpopulation. These two populations are immersed in a conflict
that is repeated continuously and no population is able to impose a solution to the other.
The conflict develops as follows. Each individual in each population faces an opponent from
the other population, both are chosen at random. This couple of individuals play a game. The
individual payoffs depend on the strategy followed by each individual of this couple. The results
for each population is the aggregate payoff obtained by each individual. The game is repeated
continuously. At the end of each stage each player in each population can redefine their strategy.
According with this election, the relative sizes of each subpopulation will be modified. The
total amount of individuals in each population are assumed constant, however the percentage
distribution between sub-populations may change over the time.
At each time themodel can be summarized by a normal form game, represented in the following
table:
II1 II2
I1 a11, b11 a12, b12
I2 a21, b21 a22, b22
By aij , i, j = 1, 2 we denote the payoff for a player of the population I playing the i−th
strategy facing and individual of population II playing the j−th strategy. Analogously the payoff
for the individuals of population II are denoted by bij .
According to Von Neumann Morgenstern’s theory, the strategic choice of each individual will
be made for the expected value of each possible pure strategy to be chosen. We denote by
PIj , j ∈ {1, 2} the probability that an individual in the population I will choose the strategy j.
Similarly PIIj will represent the probability that an individual in the population II will choose
the strategy j. It follows that pI2 = 1− pI1 and pII2 = 1− pII1.
It is assumed that these probabilities correspond to the percentage distribution of individuals
in each population following, at any given time, each of the pure strategies. That is to say that
pij = NIJ/NI where NIj denote the number of individuals that in the I population follow the
strategy j at any given time, and NI is the amount (constant) of individuals in the population I.
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We make similar assumptions for population II. Although these values change over time, in
that follows, in order to simplify the notation we omit the temporal variable.
The expected value of the strategies i = 1, 2 of a player from population I are respectively
EI1 = (a11 − a12)pII1 + a12
EI2 = (a21 − a22)pII1 + a22.
Analogously for players of the population II,
EII1 = (b11 − b12)pI1 + b12
EII2 = (b21 − b22)pI1 + b22.
We assume that the values of the payoffs for each population are different from each other.
So, at most, there is only one mixed Nash Equilibrium strategy and it is given by the solutions of




According with our model the simultaneous solution is given by
x∗ = H/K and y∗ = H ′/K ′.
Where
H = (a11 − a12)− (a21 − a22), K = a22 − a12,
H ′ = (b11 − b12)− (b21 − b22), K ′ = b22 − b12.
There a mixed Nash Equilibrium strategy if and only if:
0 < x∗ = H/K < 1 and 0 < y∗ = H ′/K ′ < 1. (2)
If the inequalities are not verified then there is not mixed Nash Equilibrium.
3 The replicator dynamics
The concept of replicator dynamics assumes two or more large population of replicators, in which
different types meet in proportion to their share in each population. This meeting - i.e. the
interaction of different replicators (e.g. different strategies in a game) - generates payoffs. Repli-
cators reproduce with regard to their payoffs in relation to the payoffs of others. The general idea
is that replicators whose payoffs are larger (smaller) than the average payoffs of the population
will increase (decrease) their share inside each the population. Summarizing, according with the
replicator dynamics, the proportion of individuals who follow the most successful behavior tends
to increase in each population. While the proportion of individuals who follow behaviors with
lower than average results tends to decrease.
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This evolutive process is modelled by the replicator dynamics. In the case of games involving
two population whose individuals have two feasible strategies, this dynamics is given by the next
system of differential equations:
ẋ = x(1− x)[Hy −K]
ẏ = y(1− y)[H ′x−K ′]
(3)
The dynamical equilibria are (0, 0), (1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1)) and (x∗, y∗).
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∗)[Hy∗ −K]− λ x∗(1− x∗)H
y∗(1− y∗)H ′ (1− 2y)H ′x∗ − λ
⎤
⎦ = 0. (5)
We have the following possibilities:
1. The simplest cases correspond to those in which there are dominant strategies. In this case
the inequalities given in (2) are not verified.
• The stationary points are given by (0, 0), (0, 1) (1, 0) or (1, 1). There exist only one
Nash equilibrium, depending on the values of the parameter H,K,H ′ and K ′ which
will be one of these dynamical equilibria. In addition it will be globally asymptotically
stable for the replicator in the interior of the square [0, 1]× [0, 1].
2. The other cases are those in which the inequalities (2) are verified. So, we can write the
equalities
K = x∗H, and K ′ = y∗H ′. (6)
Thus, the following equations hold:
K +H = (1− x∗)H, and K ′ +H ′ = (1− y∗)H ′ (7)
where 0 < x∗ < 1, 0 < y∗ < 1. Substituting (6) and (7) in equation (5), we have that the
eigenvalues are given by
λ = ±
√
x∗y∗(1− x∗)(1− y∗)HH ′
Note that the sign of the expression under the radical depends only on the sign of the product
HH ′. So, we have the following situations:
(a) If HH ′ > 0 then we have two real eigenvalues and the next two possibilities:
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i. As in [Accinelli, E,; Bazzano, B.; Robledo, F. and Romero, P.] the game has two
complementary equilibria being one of them Pareto superior: This occurs if for
instance a2 > c1, a1 > b1 and d1 > c1, d2 > b2 then: (I1, J1) and (I2, J2) are Nash
equilibria. Note that under the hypothesis of this model we have that
H > 0, K < 0, H ′ > 0, K ′ < 0, H +K > 0, H ′ +K ′ > 0.
Then we have two real eigenvalues with different signals.
ii. It corresponds to a situation which there are two Nash equilibria exist in pure
strategies: 1) Individuals of the population II prefer strategy 2 and the individuals
in population I prefer strategy 1., or reciprocally. In general if b2 > a2, b1 > d1
and c2 > d1, c1 > a1.
H < 0, K > 0, H ′ < 0, K ′ > 0, H +K < 0, H ′ +K ′ < 0.
Even in this case the eigenvalues will have the form given by the equation (5) and
from the mathematical point of view we will find that these two equilibria are both
asymptotically stable for the dynamics of the replicator. Depending on the initial
conditions, it will converge to one or another equilibrium.
(b) If HH ′ < 0 then there is no Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies, and the only mixed
Nash Equilibrium is the center of a set of continuous periodic orbits. The position of
the center will depend on the values of the parameterd.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have made an exhaustive analysis of the interaction of two populations, where individuals in
each population can choose between two possible strategies. These two populations are immersed
in a conflict that is repeated continuously. We considered the different cases that arise from the
use of replicator dynamics. We pay special attention to the study of the stability of the equilibria
corresponding to the dynamics of the replicator, and their relationship with the Nash equilibria
of a conflict modeled as a normal two populations two strategy game.
This analysis could be useful for application in several cases in which two populations are
involved in a conflict with similar characteristics to those studied here
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